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MANAGING MONEY AND CREDIT IN A
DEVELOPING ECONOMY*
BY WAYNE W. SNYDER
There is no general agreement about the exact quantitative role that
monetary policy plays in the process of determining money and credit in any
economy, nor about how it relates to the ultimate objective of economic stability.
But every government recognizes that monetary policy can be either stabilizing
or destabilizing and acknowledges its obligation to attempt the proper
management of money and credit through explicit policies. The theory of
monetary policy is, however, based mainly on the traditions and conditions in
the West, particularly the United States and Britain; such a theory, though
appropriate for highly industrialized countries, has only limited applicability
for a country where modernization has not proceeded very far.
This is not intended to suggest that economic theory as developed in the
West is generally inapplicable to the developing countries in the sense suggested
by Boeke.1 He believed that "an early death awaits" any attempt "to transplant
the tender, delicate hothouse plants of Western theory to tropical soil . .. "
(p. 143) because the basic economic and social assumptions of Western theory
have no place in an Eastern society. A wider consensus supports the view that
the differences do not render existing theory invalid, but rather require the
recognition that the behavioural and structural relationships, and their asso-
ciated parameters, need adaptation. In particular, Western economies are gen-
erally open and financial intermediaries important, albeit to differing degrees
among countries. For reasons to be stated later, it is a better approximation to
assume that developing countries are closed and that no significant credit
markets or intermediaries to banks exist.
In a developing country the central bank itself is frequently new and in-
experienced with the problems of monetary management. The commercial banks
normally are older institutions, but often they were originally foreign controlled
and were created principally to provide credit for trade (mainly the financing
of imports and exports) and plantation agriculture. In such situations many
governments have left the commercial banks to their traditional roles and have
*This article had a long gestation before reaching this form. It was conceived in my Ph.D. thesis
(Harvard University, unpublished, 1963) done under the stimulating guidance of Professor
Duesenberry, and from which a modified version of the chapter containing a quarterly model
of the banking system was published as "Money in a Developing Economy: A Case Study of
Pakistan, 1953-61," Review of Economics and Statistics XLVI (November, 1964) pp. 413-20,
and a recent reappraisal for the period 1962-67 appeared in the same Review LII (February,
1970), pp. 54-61. This paper owes much to many useful comments made on earlier versions
by several colleagues at the University of Michigan, especially Professors Porter, Shapiro
and Stolper, helpful suggestions by the referee, and the editorial assistance of Janet Eckstein.




created development corporations to provide both short- and long-term capital
to the agricultural and industrial sectors. Capital markets are rudimentary and
at best offer skimpy portfolio possibilities, which make the usual kinds of open
market operations a practical impossibility. This underdevelopment in the entire
financial sector has long been recognized as a serious restraint on the use of
traditional instruments to control money and credit, such as open-market
operations, variable reserve requirements, and discount policy.2
My purpose here is to supplement the existing literature by providing an
analytical framework which helps pinpoint the exact nature of the problems of
monetary management in a developing country, and to suggest substitute ways
to achieve the desired objectives which have been largely ignored by others.
3
In order to do this, it will be helpful first to outline the essential ingredients of
traditional theory, before suggesting how they need to be modified to fit the
general characteristics and needs of a developing country.
I. TRADITIONAL THEORY
The essential assumptions and implications of traditional theory can best
be illustrated by using a simplified version of the asset and liability statements
(T-accounts) of the central bank and the commercial banking sector. Gold and
other forms of international reserves are omitted from the assets of the central
bank because they are assumed to be either determined exogenously or among
the ultimate objectives for which the monetary policies are designed (i.e.,
balance of payments considerations). Commercial bank reserves include both
vault cash and other reserves, but exclude any excess reserves which the assump-
Central Bank Commercial Banks
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
(G 1) Government (C) Currency (R) Reserves of (D) Demand
securities commercial deposits
banks
(B) Borrowing (R) Reserves of (B) Borrowing
by commer- commercial ( ernent from the
cial banks banks Securities central bank
(L) Loans to the
private sector
2See, for example, Arthur I. Bloomfield, "Monetary Policy in Underdeveloped Countries,"
in Public Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 232-74; Peter G. Fousek,
Foreign Central Banking: The Instruments of Monetary Policy (New York: Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, 1957); S. Ghosh, "Monetary Control in an Underdeveloped Economy,"
Economia Internazionale (November 1960), pp. 603-10; D. R. Khatkhate, Problems of
Monetary Policy in a Developing Country (Bombay: Co-operative Book Depot, 1954); S. N.
Sen, Central Banking in Underdeveloped Money Markets, 3rd ed. (Calcutta: Bookland, 1961).
3See, however, Graeme S. Dorrance, "The Instruments of Monetary Policy in Countries With-
out Highly Developed Capital Markets," IMF Staff Papers, 12 (July 1965), pp. 272-81, for
explicit suggestions concerning the traditional instruments which are likely to be most effective
in helping a developing country to achieve its monetary objectives, and Richard. C. Porter,
"Narrow Security Markets and Monetary Policy: Lessons from Pakistan," Economic Develop-
ment and Cultural Change 14 (October 1965), pp. 48-60, for a discussion of how to establish
a fairly broad market for government securities within the limitations of a developing country.
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tion of competitive and frictionless markets assures. Time deposits are omitted
from commercial bank liabilities for simplicity and because they are not
generally considered to be part of the money supply;4 they will be introduced
into the theory at a later stage. Other assets and liabilities such as net worth,
government deposits, foreign non-monetary items, etc. are also omitted for
simplicity. At best they are exogenously determined factors which central banks
must consider when making their policies; at worst they further complicate
effective control of money and credit. Traditional theory about the functioning




(4) R = rD
(5) G 1+B = C+R
(6) R+G 2 +L = D+B
Traditional theory assumes that the total government debt is determined
by fiscal policy, but that through its open market operations the central bank
controls whatever amount of government securities it wishes in its portfolio,
expressed by relationship (1). The central bank also controls its loans to com-
mercial banks by a combination of varying its discount rate, moral suasion, and
other accepted banking practices, expressed by relationship (2). Together these
assets are the counterpart of its two liabilities: currency and commercial bank
reserves. The central bank permits the nonbanking private sector to hold what-
ever proportion of the total volume of money in the economy that it wishes,
expressed by relationship (3). For any given level of its total assets, the central
bank controls the level of demand deposits (and ultimately the total volume of
money) through the required reserve ratio, expressed by relationship (4).
The model is closed by the two accounting identities (5) and (6), from which an
identity for the relationship between total bank credit and money can be
obtained:
(7) G 1+G 2 +L = C+D
A "money multiplier" is implicit in the reduced-form equation for the




Although the money multiplier, expressed in this highly simplified form, is hardly
more than a tautology, it provides a useful way to discuss the potential effective-
ness of monetary policy. Monetary theory suggests that the immediate objective,
controlling the money supply, can be accomplished by varying any one of the
40r, as officially explained, "savings and time deposits, while serving a store-of-value function,
are not in themselves means of payment; only currency and demand deposits serve in this
active monetary role," The Federal Reserve System: Purposes and Functions, 5th ed.
(Washington, D. C.: Board of Governors, 1963), pp. 7-8.
sFor the derivation of the money multiplier see Richard Goode and Richard S. Thorn,
"Variable Reserve Requirements Against Commercial Bank Deposits," IMF Staff Papers 7
(April 1959), p. 43.
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three traditional instruments available to central banks: the required reserve
ratio (r), open market operations in government securities (G 1), and the level
of loans to commercial banks (B). 6 The potential effectiveness of the traditional
instruments in a developing country is discussed below.
II. THE REQUIRED RESERVE RATIO
Varying the required reserve ratio is unlike the other two traditional in-
struments, which allow commercial banks to react through market mechanisms,
because it forces every bank to adjust to the new rate. For this reason it has often
been described as a blunt instrument useful "in dealing with crisis or near-crisis
situations."7 In practice, its use is infrequent even among the financially mature
countries. The United States has changed the rate less than a dozen times since
1949,8 and the Bank of England was only recently authorized to require reserves
(although traditionally commercial banks maintained a virtually constant 8
per cent cash ratio).9 In other countries its use is generally rarer than in the
United States, although a few countries, notably Australia and New Zealand,
have altered the reserve requirement frequently, and some other countries have
even used it to meet seasonal variations.'0 If its bluntness is a drawback to
its frequent use, this can easily be eliminated by making changes apply only to
additional deposits, i.e., by using a combination of basic and marginal rates.
Undoubtedly, variations in the required reserve ratio can be made smoothly
enough to eliminate the instrument's bluntness, but its potential effectiveness
is far less for a developing country than for a financially mature one. The money
multiplier of relationship (8) and Figure 1 helps to illustrate this fact.
In a developed country, currency represents only a small proportion of the
total volume of money, in some cases no more than 20 per cent, and reserves are
typically even lower; together these factors produce a high money multiplier.
For example, if currency represents 20 per cent of the money supply and reserves
10 per cent, the money multiplier is 3.6 and an increase in the required reserve
ratio from 10 to 11 per cent will, ceteris paribus, cause the money supply to fall
by 3 per cent. In a developing country, both reserves and currency (especially
the latter) are typically higher. For example, if currency represents 60 per cent
of the money supply and reserves 25 per cent, then the money multiplier is only
1.4; in order to obtain a similar decrease in the money supply (i.e., 3 per cent),
it is necessary to raise the required reserve ratio from 25 to 30 per cent.
Having to vary the required reserve ratio by larger amounts in order to
achieve comparable impacts on the money supply is not by itself an undesirable
feature, unless this creates greater uncertainty than would otherwise be the case;
but in the process of acquiring the additional reserves the commercial banks in
6The currency/money ratio (c) can also be influenced by the monetary authorities via their
effect on the rate at which banking facilities are expanded and by offering interest on demand
deposits, but the short-term importance is not likely to be substantial.
7Dorrance, op. cit., p. 276.
8This excludes several minor adjustments; see Federal Reserve Bulletin (July 1965), p. 276.
9R. S. Sayers, Modern Banking, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), p. 37.
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r = demand deposits
Source: International Financial Statistics for end of September 1968
(Washington, D.C.; International Monetary Fund).
a developing country will have to reduce their earning assets (G
2 +L) by more
than in a developed economy (by 9 per cent as compared with 4 per cent in the
above example). The process is symmetrical, of course, as changes in the required
reserve ratio designed to induce identical percentage increases in the money
supply will result in proportionally larger increases in the earning assets of
commercial banks in developing than in financially mature economies. Under-
standably, central banking authorities are hesitant to use this instrument,
because it requires such a drastic adjustment by commercial banks in order to




The consequences of having a small money multiplier in a developing coun-
try are not limited to the potential inefficiency of varying the required reserve
ratio to achieve monetary objectives. Monetary policies affecting the central
bank's assets (G1 and B) also have relatively smaller effects on money in
a developing than in an already developed country. The adjustment process of
using open market operations and direct control of the level of loans to com-
mercial banks does, however, avoid the drastic features of large changes in the
required reserve ratio and the substantial adjustments these force upon the
commercial banks.1 1
III. OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS
Open market operations are the principal means of implementing monetary
policies in most developed countries, but there are several major restraints on
their use in developing economies. The most important limitation stems from the
distribution of government debt. In many countries little, if any, government
debt is held by the non-banking private sector.1 2 Fiscal policy determines the
amount of total government debt, which must be virtually divided between the
central bank and the commercial banking sector. Some central banks have
authority to issue their own bonds, but this does not provide an extra degree of
freedom in attaining monetary objectives unless the bonds are widely held by
both the banking and the non-banking private sectors.'3 Hence tripartite tran-
sactions in government securities among the central bank, the commercial banks,
and the non-banking private sector are excluded because sales are limited
between the central bank and commercial banks. If used effectively, however,
this reduced market would still give considerable manoeuverability to the
monetary authorities, but further restraints are self-imposed.
Governments are often unwilling to permit the central bank to create the
conditions under which a real market for securities can exist. They frequently
feel that the price for government bonds must remain within a narrow band of
stable and relatively low interest rates, unrelated to those outside the supervised
money markets.4 This results in part from a belief that stable prices and re-
'In the long run the efficiency of all monetary policies can be increased if the money multiplier
becomes larger. This can be accomplished by encouraging the expansion of banking facilities,
which will cause the currency/money ratio to decrease, and by creating a stable financial
climate so that the reserve ratio (r) decreases also; both will tend to increase the
money multiplier and enhance the effectiveness of every monetary measure.
12An article in the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics, 13
(October 1960), p. ii, gives a distribution of the ownership of government debt for 26 coun-
tries; they are ranked from the lowest to the highest with respect to the percentage of govern-
ment debt held by the non-banking private sector. It is not surprising that the ranking is
roughly similar to that which would arise if they were ranked from the less to the more
financially mature countries. But exceptions stand out. In both Germany and New Zealand
the non-banking private sectors hold less than 25 per cent of government debt while the
commercial banks hold approximately 50 per cent, a situation which impedes transactions
in government securities between the central bank and the non-banking private sector.
13The central banks of Argentina and Ceylon have used their authority to issue their own
bonds; for a discussion of their effectiveness see Bloomfield, op. cit.
"4 See U Tan Wai's ground-breaking studies, "Interest Rates in the Organized Money Markets
of Underdeveloped Countries," IMF Staff Papers, V (August 1956), pp. 249-278, and "In-
terest Rates Outside the Organized Money Markets of Underdeveloped Countries," IMF
Staff Papers, VI (November 1957), pp. 80-142.
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latively low interest rates are a sign of respectability and engender domestic and
international confidence wheareas high rates impede investment and allow the
commercial banks unnecessarily high profits. Because the banking sector as a
whole must absorb virtually all of any new government debt issued, central
banks often prefer using moral pressure to ensure that the commercial banks
will hold their "fair share," rather than inducing them to do so through a market
mechanism. The cost of such policies is that open market operations becomes
an ineffective tool of monetary policy.1 5
Such situations are not inevitable, but unfortunately they are typical of
many developing countries. The limited nature of their security markets, com-
bined with a low money multiplier, results in the necessity of larger open market
transactions in order to achieve the same effects on the money supply for a
developing country than for one already financially mature. This means that if
open market transactions are to be effectively used, such countries must be
willing to permit fluctuations of interest rates over a greater range than has been
normal among most developed countries; so far the number of countries willing
to do this is limited. But with a growing experience and awareness that the dis-
advantages of not developing a workable market for government securities
(involving as it must fairly frequent and large changes in interest rates) are even
more detrimental to the ultimate objective of enhancing economic stability, more
countries are beginning to move toward greater eliance on market mechanisms
to achieve their monetary objectives. However, until a fully developed tripartite
system is created, open market operations will necessarily remain a more limited
instrument of monetary policy in a developing than in a financially mature
economy.
IV. CENTRAL BANK LOANS TO COMMERCIAL BANKS
The remaining traditional instrument-control of commercial bank borrow-
ing from the central bank-can be an extremely important and effective instru-
ment; indeed it is thought by some to be the most powerful one in a developing
economy.1 6 Unlike variations in the required reserve ratio, controlling the
amount of commercial bank indebtedness to the central bank is similar to an
open market operation, because individual banks are free to increase or decrease
their borrowing and hence can influence the multiplier powers of total bank
reserves.
If this is to be an effective instrument, at least one condition must be met:
the quantity of commercial bank borrowing from the central bank must be
large enough so that variations can produce the desired change in commercial
bank reserves. There can be no absolute minimum, but certainly a high per-
centage of borrowed reserves improves the likelihood of this instrument's
success. In some countries (e.g., Columbia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey)
commercial bank borrowing from the central bank is more than twice as large
as total (gross) commercial bank reserves, clearly indicating that this instrument
could be effectively used there; in many others the ratio exceeds 100 per cent
i sPakistan is an excellent case in point. See Richard C. Porter, op. cit.
1 6DorranCe, op. cit., p. 278.
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(e.g., Greece, India, Morocco, the Philippines, and Spain). In only a few coun-
tries is the ratio less than 25 per cent (e.g., Brazil, Ceylon, Ecuador, Iran, Korea,
Peru, and Portugal), suggesting that it might be quantitatively more difficult for
them to use this instrument effectively.' 7
Controlling the amount of commercial bank borrowing from the central
bank can be accomplished in two ways: either by varying the interest
rate charged by the central bank or by direct quantitative controls. The first
has the advantage of leaving individual commercial banks free to make their
own choice about borrowing from the central bank, based on the cost of borrow-
ing and their expectations about their customers' demand for loanable funds.
It must be recognized, however, that relatively high discount rates are likely to
be required in order to make this method workable. It is well known that central
bankers feel they are part of an international banking community and
consequently have a strong desire to maintain interest rates generally, and their
own discount rate specifically, well within an "acceptable norm," a rate at which
demand is likely to be well in excess of the desired level. The central bank dis-
count rates published in the IMF's International Financial Statistics confirm
this view; only two countries use discount rates which are high enough to suggest
they are important factors which determine commercial bank borrowing, Korea
(28 per cent) and Nationalist China (13.3 per cent). A few other countries use
rates of 7-9 per cent, which conceivably could be high enough to be a determining
factor, but most of these are Latin American countries where the normal rate
of inflation substantially reduces their possible importance (and in some cases
implies negative real interest rates) and where central bank credit is rationed by
quota allocations.
The conclusion is clear: if central banks are not willing to adopt discount
rates high enough to influence borrowing decisions, then direct quantitative
controls are the only alternative. The argument against these controls is that
they have to be specific and thus tend to encourage rigidity rather than flexibi-
lity in the banking system. Also, they necessarily entail greater administrative
surveillance than does the automatic working of an interest rate to regulate
market demand. Such a system is really no more than central bank direct re-
gulation of commercial bank lending, because it requires an intimate relation-
ship and frequent contacts between the central bank authorities and the directors
of individual commercial banks. One can imagine the usual array of undesirable
consequences often associated with direct bureaucratic controls, but it may be
the only acceptable manner of exercising adequate control over central bank
credit. Every effort must be taken to make the system of quantitative controls
flexible and coordinated with other economic objectives, one of which may be
to control both money and commercial bank lending to the private sector.
V. CONTROLLING BOTH MONEY AND COMMERCIAL BANK LOANS
The monetary authorities in most countries feel that they are responsible
for regulating the volume of money and credit, although often they do not make
17Data from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, XXI (September
1968). Dorrance says that in 1963 in "almost half of the 81 countries for which data are
given in International Financial Statistics, credit from the central bank to the deposit-money
banks was equal to at least 10 per cent of money," op. cit., pp. 278-79.
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clear whether they mean managing both simultaneously and independently, or
merely one or the other. Traditional theory, as developed in relationships (1)
through (8) appears to imply that both money (C+D) and commercial bank
credit (G 2 +L) can be controlled independently, if the central bank is willing
to use forcefully at least two of the three available traditional instruments (open-
market operations, variable reserve requirements, and discount policy.) 1 8
Curiously enough the literature on monetary policy, its instruments and
goals, does not contain a concise discussion of the fundamental question: can
the three traditional instruments control money and credit simultaneously?
Excellent theoretical and practical considerations explain why the three tradi-
tional instruments are not independent; for a given set of values there will exist
a unique pair of equilibrium values of money and credit, rather than a variable
and determinate relationship between money and credit which can be controlled
by using an appropriate combination of two or more of the traditional instru-
ments. The International Monetary Fund's view has always been that more
instruments are needed; Polak has discussed this issue indirectly, and Dorrance
and White have argued that different kinds of specific ceilings are required to
achieve simultaneously more than one objective.19 Katz has described why the
European central banks after 1958 were forced to innovate by creating addi-
tional policy instruments to manage domestic redit and international reserves
simultaneously, albeit with mixed success.20 In the United States, where balance
of payments considerations and fluctuations in international reserves have never
dominated monetary policy, the Federal Reserve has sometimes emphasized
controlling credit (more often than not), sometimes money, and sometimes it
has said that its responsibility was to control the two simultaneously (and by
implication independently).21
Unlike those European countries which have developed monetary policies,
to control domestic credit and international reserves simultaneously, the
developing countries can be characterized as closed economies because their
exports do not depend substantially on domestic demand considerations, and
their imports are generally controlled via various forms of quotas and
rationing arrangements. The range from completely closed to entirely open
economies does, of course, exist among the developing countries. The island-
1 8For independently chosen levels of money (C + D) and commercial bank credit (G 2 + L), open
market transactions can assure that the central bank holds the necessary amount of govern-
ment securities (G1) to fulfill the credit-money requirement of identity (7). Given whatever
G1 this implies, by varying either its loans to commercial banks (B) or the required reserve
ratio, the central bank can determine independently the volume of money desired through
the relationship (8).
19J. J. Polak, "Monetary Analysis of Income Formation and Payments Problems," IMF Staff
Papers VI (November, 1957), pp. 1-50, and Graeme S. Dorrance and William H. White,
"Alternative Forms of Monetary Ceilings for Stabilization Purposes," IMF Staff Papers IX
(November 1962), pp. 317-342.20Samuel I. Katz, External Surpluses, Capital Flows, and Credit Policy in the European
Economic Community 1958 to 1967, Princeton Studies in International Finance No. 22
(Princeton: University Press, 1969).
21Lawrence S. Ritter, "Official Central Banking Theory in the United States, 1939-61: Four
Editions of the Federal Reserve System: Purposes and Functions," Journal of Political
Economy, 70 (February 1962), pp. 14-29.
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type economies are generally completely open with respect to both trading and
capital flows which pose additional constraints on the range of independent
monetary management (e.g. Singapore, Hong Kong, Cyprus, Malta, Bahama
Islands), but the vast majority of developing countries are relatively closed
economies.
Similar to some developed economies, the developing countries recognize
the necessity to manage money and credit simultaneously. Furthermore, there
are good reasons why a developing country, even more than a financially mature
one, will want to regulate not otal commercial bank credit but only that portion
which provides loans to the private sector; and within this portion, it is likely
to want to influence the allocation to particular categories of borrowers in order
to make sure that funds go where their productivity will be the highest. Most
commercial banks in developing countries, however, continue to concentrate
mainly on providing short-term credit to a limited number of large and con-
servatively managed establishments where risks are low; 2 2 they are hesitant
to diversify over a broader spectrum of borrowers where risk elements are likely
to be considerably higher. But the need to provide longer-term credit to new
enterprises is important; the commercial banks with their long lending ex-
perience, are better suited to adapting their traditional role to meet this need
than is the central government equiped to administer the allocation of develop-
ment loans, either directly or by creating investment banks which sometimes
become mired in the conflict between allocating funds according to potential
profitability and political considerations.2 3 The commercial banks, however,
will not accept this new responsibility without economic inducements and some
direct controls.
Clearly, general monetary policies relying only on the traditional in-
struments are inadequate to achieve this objective. Even simultaneously con-
trolling the total volume of bank credit to the private sector and the money
supply are not feasible objectives under the conditions described thus far, as
the money-credit identity of relationship (7), G1+G 2-+L = C+D, makes
immediately clear. If fiscal policy determines the total amount of government
debt, which must be absorbed by the central and the commercial banks, then
the sum of G1 and G2 is predetermined and outside the control of the monetary
authorities. The monetary system at best permits controlling either credit to the
private sector (L) or the money supply (C+D), but not both simultaneously.
As illustrated previously, changes in the amount of bank credit are likely to be
relatively larger than changes in the money supply, which can have important
consequences. Many developing countries occasionally overheat their economies
when they attempt to achieve high growth rates. This leads to stabilization
policies aimed at dampening over-all demand by slowing or reversing the rate
of growth of money. But this necessarily dries up bank loans to the private
2 20n 31 March 1959, 63 per cent of total bank credit in Pakistan was retained by
only 222 accounts, according to the government of Pakistan's Credit Enquiry Commission
Report (Karachi, 8 September 1959), p. 5. The monetary authorities of Pakistan have proudly
noted the complete absence of bank failures since independence.
23See, Shirley Boskey, Problems and Practices of Development Banks (Baltimore: The Johns




sector at an even faster pace and reduces the amount of loanable funds available
to create eventually the needed additional productive capacity which ultimately
is the only means whereby excessive demand can be eliminated in a growing
economy.
If both money and credit are to be controlled simultaneously, and if
commercial banks are to be induced to allocate their loanable funds in greater
accord with priorities determined by the government, two things are essential:
(1) the traditional instruments must work as effectively as possible, and (2)
additional selective instruments must be created to supplement the traditional
instruments. The effectiveness of both variations in the required reserve ratio
and open market operations of the traditional tripartite kind depends upon the
general development of financial behaviour, and government efforts to make
them more effective can be marginal at best (although even for the present stage
of development no country uses open market operations as efficiently as
possible).
It would be utopian to think that the developing economies can hope to
achieve what the financially mature countries have not been able to do, i.e., the
simultaneous control of both money and commercial bank lending to the private
sector. Nevertheless, they can make some progress towards this objective by
making every effort to broaden the market for government securities and to
establish appropriate selective credit policies which are integrated with their
planning aspirations.
One further improvement is possible. Time deposits are an important
financial instrument in every country, but in a developing one they take on
particular importance, because the range of alternative uses of personal savings
is very limited: cash, demand deposits, land, and house building are the main
possibilities, plus reinvestment in individual enterprises. Due to the risk elements
of the latter two items, time deposits are usually a principal means of
accumulating household savings. While time deposits depend heavily upon the
level and rate of growth of personal saving, nevertheless, interest rates and other
forms of incentives can be used to regulate partially, if not completely, their
level. To the extent that some independent control is gained over their deter-
mination, the monetary authorities can realize greater flexibility in their attempt
to achieve an optimum combination of money and bank loans.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The conventional theory of monetary policy, which was developed mainly
from conditions prevailing in the United States and Britain needs to be modified
in order to reflect the structural and behavioural characteristics of a typical
developing country. For individual countries the theory must be further
modified, to incorporate their own particular sets of determining factors. 24
The developed countries, using only the traditional instruments of monetary
policy such as open market operations, variations in the required reserve ratio,
and controls on commercial bank borrowing from the central bank, can at best
control either money or commercial bank loans to the private sector; many
2 4See, Snyder, op. cit.
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developing countries will not find this sufficient. In their efforts to regulate both
money and bank loans, the monetary authorities need a greater variety of in-
struments, both traditional and specific, than is used by the developed countries.
Although this need inevitably introduces a greater reliance on quantitative con-
trols than on the market to make the appropriate allocation of loanable funds,
that may even be an improvement, because commercial banks tend to avoid
making risky loans and confine themselves to lending to conservative and well-
established firms, letting excess reserves accumulate if their rigid criteria for a
"bankable" loan are not met. In order to achieve a better allocation of loan-
able funds, the central banking authorities need to use a wide variety of regulated
interest rates on time deposits, on their loans to commercial banks, and on the
latter's loans for various purposes.
The potential effectiveness of monetary policy is more limited in a develop-
ing country than in one already financially mature, if reliance is placed on the
traditional instruments alone. But if enough other instruments are employed,
without creating too many conflicting objectives, then monetary policies can
make a more positive contribution to the ultimate objective of greater economic
stability and growth.
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